European Populism: Social and Institutional Effects

Author: Wyatt Raynal, The Australian National University

Rising European populism is symptomatic of a crisis in the post-1989 liberal democratic order. In 2016, the Brexit movement prevailed in Britain, promising a break with the European Union (EU) would allow citizens to “take back control”.1 Fears of ‘losing control’ underpin a movement away from democracy as a contemporary democratic crisis. Across Europe, populists have drawn on a public zeitgeist of disempowerment, in which many feel they have lost control of economics, politics and sovereign borders. These fears have incited backlash against the liberal establishment, inspired critique of the neoliberal consensus and pushed politicians to undermine the separation of powers.2 The increasing election of anti-establishment parties and a widespread recourse to nationalistic rhetoric indicate a rejection of globalisation amongst European populations.3 Fukuyama’s 1989 projections of the “end of history”, in which liberal democracies occupy a forevermore uncontested space at the heart of Europe, appear premature.4

The “post-1989 democratic order” is defined by Krastev as a network of representative European democracies dominated by liberal, open-market and pro-globalisation ideologies.5 Furthermore, “Populism” as defined by Wodak, refers to a suite of politicians claiming to be the sole representatives of “the people” against educated elites.6

Widespread fears of a loss of economic control have encouraged actors to reject the internationalist component of the post-1989 democratic order. Globalisation has increased economic inequalities within Europe since the 1970s, raising the divide between rich and poor.7 Additionally, free-market capitalism has left much of the global financial order beyond state control, limiting the say of citizens in how their finances are regulated.8 In this environment, the movement of capital across borders has become deregulated, and transnational corporations exert disproportionate pressure upon governments.9 Finally, EU membership requirements have put what Friedman calls the “golden straightjacket” on post-Soviet states.10 In order to gain the benefits of economic integration, Eastern European countries must submit to “structural adjustment” requirements. Whilst this may grow an economy, such requirements limit a states sovereign political power.11 Resulting perceptions of disempowerment have been linked to an increased regional focus on identity politics, over which populations have greater control, as well as calls to renew the economic sovereignty of the nation state.12 Both Brexit and the 2016 Austrian election demonstrate the way economic disempowerment has encouraged citizens to challenge the globalist democratic order.13 In the former case, Britons rejected the economic and political impositions of the EU, pushing back at globalisation and renegotiating trade deals.14 Brexit support is well correlated with globalisation-induced poverty: poorer, less educated males were the most likely demographic to vote leave.15 The latter case, in which Norbert Hofer of the Austrian Freedom Party received the most votes, tells a similar story.16 In rejection of the neoliberal establishment, blue-collar workers flocked to Hofer’s right-wing populism, which promised an end to globalisation and foreign economic controls.17 In this way, economic disempowerment has encouraged resistance against globalist aspects of the European democratic order.

Faltering faith in governing institutions and the erosion of checks and balances by populists represent a second component of Europe’s democratic crisis. Outrage at the 2009 Westminster expenses scandal and similar instances of corruption has fed a political climate in which governing institutions are considered untrustworthy.18 Illustratively, only 28% of Europeans polled in 2018 said they trusted their national parliament.19 The rise of a “political class” also appears to have played a role in fuelling mistrust.20 Professor Peter Mair has noted that political parties “have become so disconnected from wider society… that they no longer seem capable of sustaining democracy”.21 Sentiments of political disempowerment have encouraged greater numbers of Europeans to turn to self-branded political “outsiders”.22 Operators like Jorg Haider of the Austrian Freedom Party have courted the vote by positioning themselves in opposition to elites.23 As Haider declared in 1999, “Although the ruling class has never forgiven us [for running]… the people have thanked us”.24 Populists have frequently exploited public mistrust through the mobilisation of conspiracy theories.25 True instances of political corruption, like links between Rupert Murdoch and British politicians, have been extrapolated upon, making it appear that liberal democracies are run by an informal collective of unelected lobbyists, bankers and elites.26 Poland’s Law and Justice Party has been significantly benefitted by conspiracy theories surrounding the 2010 Smolensk plane crash.27 By suggesting that the crash represented an assassination attempt on his brother, party leader Jarosław Kaczyński has fed into victimisation narratives, implying that elites are targeting him.28 Exploitation of mistrust has allowed populist leaders to erode checks and balances, expanding personal power with the ostensible goal of overcoming institutional barriers to progress.29 In Poland, Kaczyński has systematically crippled the Constitutional Court, ignoring its rulings on the basis that they do not represent the popular will.30 Feelings of political disempowerment have therefore added to the crisis of European democracy, encouraging actors to dismantle its institutions.

The migrant crisis represents a third pillar of Europe’s democratic crisis, with popular anxieties undermining the “liberal” spirit at central to the democratic order. Populists have played on public fears or border erosion to promote illiberal ideologies like nativism and nationalism.31 Diverse immigrant-related anxieties have been invoked. Demographic anxiety is a major motivating force in Bulgaria, where locals are fearful of becoming a minority population as their numbers dwindle and immigration increases.32 This fear is made tangible by projections that the native Bulgarian population will shrink 27% by 2050.33 Populist organisations have also effectively co-opted feminist ideals in the promotion of illiberalism.34 Pseudo-feminist rhetoric has been widely deployed against Islam, with politicians like Marine Le Pen opposing female headscarves on grounds of sexism.35 As Dutch populist Geert Wilders warned in 2011, “Multiculturalism has made us so tolerant that we tolerate the intolerant.”36 Invocation of these fears has given populist leaders grounds to enact nativist policy. Prime Minister Robert Fico has stated that Slovakia will only accept Christian refugees.37 Viktor Orban of Hungary has held a referendum on whether his country should have to accept the refugees allocated to them by Brussels at all.38 Rejection of EU mandates in favour of nationalist rhetoric represents a major turn away from the values of liberal democracy. The migrant crisis has become fuel for the democratic crisis.

Democracy derives its governing mandate from its constituents. Given that economic, political and migrant crises have encouraged many Europeans to turn away from the established order, it becomes clear that a democratic crisis exists. Populism has paved the way for a new order of “illiberal democracy” in which broad populations seek to “take back control”.39 In the face of contemporary crises, the liberal democratic order has attempted to overthrow itself.