Women in Boko Haram: Understanding Female Participation in Terrorism

Author: Romane Tholomé, Columbia University

This essay problematizes existing research on women, gender, and terrorism in the context of their participation in Boko-Haram. It argues that adopting a gender-based approach prevents generalizations of women’s situations, allowing them to reclaim agency with regards to their different motivations for participating in terrorism. Investigating women in terrorism in such a way brings to light crucial downfalls in governance and women’s empowerment in the Lake Chad Basin area which make women vulnerable to be being recruited by Boko Haram

On June 8th 2014, a middle-aged woman riding a motorcycle was stopped at the 01 battalion barrack of Nigerian army in Gombe. As she was stopped to be searched, the woman detonated explosives which were strapped to her body, concealed under her hijab, taking her own life and that of a Nigerian soldier. This marks Boko Haram’s first use of a female suicide bomber, surprising West Africa and sending Nigeria in a state of shock. Since then, the use of female suicide bombers by Boko Haram has done nothing but increase, and as of 2015, 17 more female suicide bombings have taken place in Nigeria as part of Boko Haram’s efforts to impose Shariah law in the Lake Chad Basin (George and Onuoha ).

The 21st century has been characterized by the rise in terrorism as a response to a rapidly changing world, destablizing social orders that have been in place for centuries. One of these terrorist groups is Boko Haram, literally meaning Western Education is a Sin, which has used terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin area in order to promote the rule of Shariah and Islamist ideology. It was originally founded by Mohammed Yusuf in the 1990s, in the state of Borno, to denounce corruption in the Nigerian government. However, in 2002 the group takes on a new enemy: Western civilization and its values. The group refuses to recognize Western, secular modes of education inherited from colonial times and furthermore condemns mixing of genders, use of the Gregorian calendar, and other practices such as sports which distract from Islam (Rosenzweig). At first the group’s targets are mainly military and police as well a Muslims whom they believe are not properly applying Islamic rules. However, in 2009, a tense repression of the movement by the Nigerian government, leading to the death of Yusuf, marks a new era for Boko Haram. Yusuf is replaced by Abubakar Shekau, and Boko Haram members fled to rural Nigeria to reconvene. Far from being weakened by the loss of their leader, this event marks a new chapter for Boko Haram where violence and terrorism reign. While the phenomenon of terrorism is well documented and reported upon, what seems to be missing is the narrative of the female members. Indeed, in Western media we often hear of the leaders of various terrorist organizations which are traditionally male, for example, Mohamed Yusuf and Abubakar Shekau. The times when women are mentioned, they are presented as victims of gender and physical violence. There seems to be a gap in the literature of women as perpetrators of terrorism which leads me to the question: Can women be considered as independent actors in terrorism or are they indeed victims of gender based violence and coerced into committing acts of terrorism? Boko Haram is a particularly significant case with respect to female narratives as it is known for using more women compared to other groups similar in ideology.

To understand the use of women by Boko Haram we must first look at how and why women are joining Boko Haram. Women represent a socially, economically, and politically marginalized population in Nigeria which makes them easier targets for recruitment by Boko Haram. In the book Gender and Power Relations in Nigeria A.A. Idowu demonstrates that many institutions marginalize women in Nigeria. The first one is political institutions. In Northern Nigeria’s penal code the battery of a wife is permitted “for the purpose of correcting her (...) provided that the result does not amount to infliction of grievous hurt” (Idowu, 35). Women are also politically misrepresented and in 2007 six of the 360 deputies in the parliament were women (Nigéria : les femmes et Boko Haram). They are also marginalized in the familial institution where harmful traditional practices such as genital mutilation, forced early marriages, domestic violence, and etc… are the norm for many women. Purdah is also a common practice in Nigerian society which consists in alienating women from the rest of society. Finally, they are also largely left out of economic institutions. For example, women constitute 80 percent of the agricultural workforce while at the same time denied rights to land ownership, and they are rarely found in top hierarchical positions (Idowu 36). Idowu explains that this lower status translates itself in some women having less education than men, and thus causing them to be even more vulnerable to gender based violence as they have been socialized to accept male domination (Idowu 38). Ultimately, Nigerian society, gender norms related to soceital customs and Islam has systematically margenilazed women, and weakened the social fabric needed for a stable community, making them more prone to being taken up by Boko Haram. According to Temitope Ola ``This indicates that female disempowerment and marginalisation by a patriarchal system is a major reason why young women participate in violent public conduct.” (Ola).

This practice has pushed many women towards Islam as a way of regaining a little bit of control over their lives by focusing on religion, prayers, learning the Qaran. Thus, because many women are so marginalized, they make for an easier target of Boko Haram’s propaganda. Another reason why women have been joining the ranks of Boko Haram is a result of sexual violence used in armed conflict in the area where Boko Haram is active. Indeed, rape is a common phenonmenon during village raids, causing the disintegration of the social fabric, and of the family as the basic social unit. These marginalized women, who have been raped are often rejected by their families as having had premarital sex and which leaves them vulnerable to be recruited by Boko Haram (Bloom, Matfess). This experience of rape during armed conflict may also lead women to believe that they would be safer being a part of Boko Haram than being against it. Furthermore, many women are left widowed as a result of conflict in the area and in Nigeria widows are an even strongly marginalized group of women (Idowu 36). While some women are attracted to Boko Haram’s ideology and treatment of women, a significant proportion of female recruits are women and young girls who have been kidnapped and abducted. The most famous example of this is the kidnapping of 217 girls in Chibok in 2014 which prompted international outcry and shock. While the kidnapping prompted the campaign #bringbackourgirls, few have been liberated. Although Nigerian authorities put in place the Safe School Initiative, many believe that the government is not doing enough to protect its young women (Amnesty International). Even more concerning, is that the kidnapping coincides with an increase in use of female suicide bombers by Boko Haram. Many fear that these bombers are in fact Chibok girls. While these explanations give a good indicator of some of the possible motivations for women to join Boko Haram, in their book Women, Gender, and Terrorism, the authors of the introduction Laura Sjoberg, an American feminist scholar speicialised in international security, Grace Cooke, and Stacy Neal, warn against a reductory analysis of women in terrorism. They criticize the practice of trying to classify women’s motivation as different to men’s and describe it as a gendered process which negates the individuality of women’s situations and motivations.

These scholars stand against literature which justifies women’s participation in terrorism as stemming solely from personal reasons, such as vengeance or marginalization, as opposed to political ones: “women who commit violence have been characterized as anything but regular criminals or regular soldiers or regular terrorists; they are captured in storied fantasies which deny women’s agency and reify gender stereotypes and subordination” (Laura Sjoberg, Caron E 2). They point out that the generalization that women join terrorist ranks because of abuse, marginalization, or other personal reason is the most cited while the justification by political devotion is rarely mentioned, even though it is the leading explanation for men’s terrorism. However, as American scholar specialist in women and war as well as conflicts in the Muslim world, Farhana Qazi remarks in her chapter Tracing the Early Warriors of Islam, avoiding these generalizations, albeit necessary, is difficult due to the lack of primary sources when studying female terrorism and suicide bombers (Laura Sjoberg, Caron E. 31). Most Islamist terrorist organizations, including Boko Haram, are closed off to outsiders and nonmembers and thus the collection of testimonies and primary data is made virtually impossible. Most primary sources come from survivors of suicide bombers or the rare escapees. This analytical framework proposed in Women, Gender, and Terorrism, shows that in order to properly analyse the role of women within a terrorist organization one must adopt a gender-based approach. Indeed, like all institutions within society terrorist organizations operate within gender roles and are structured by them. Within Boko Haram, women can play different roles. Some are more traditional gendered roles such as being a wife to a Boko Haram soldier and have children to increase the organization’s ranks (Nigéria : les femmes et Boko Haram). Women are also used to cook, to carry the soldier’s equipment, but also to enhance a soldier’s status through the act of marriage. As Qazi explains, this is a reflection of women’s role in classical Islamist literature of being a “mother, sister, daughter, and wife of Muslim men at war” (Laura Sjoberg, Caron E, 35).

These women and young girls can also play a part in the recruitment process for younger male soldiers through the promise of sexual pleasure, usually against their will, but also for other women. By looking at recruitment mechanisms through the lens of gender we gain a better understanding of women’s position within Boko Haram. As Hilary Bloom, a scholar from Georgia State University specialized in Middle East studies, and Hillary Matfess, a Yale PhD candidate focusing on gender and conflict in sub-Saharan Africa, show in their article, women, especially younger ones are seen as “malleable” (Bloom, Matfess 112) and thus more easily brainwashed.. According to these authors, women are seen as expendable and therefore constitute artillery for Boko Haram (Bloom, Matfess 112). While at first glance, Boko Haram can seem to be progressive and an opportunity for women to emancipate themselves from being mothers, sisters, daughters, and wives who are confined to exist in the domestic sector, it is in fact a reification of gender norms where women are regarded as the weaker gender and are therefore more disposable. As Bloom and Matfess write in their text they are therefore seen as expendable artillery which is not a position of power, even if marketed as such by the organization. Thus, the ruling mechanism in Boko Haram remains women in a position of vulnerability which reproduces the schematics of patriarchal Nigerian society. Gender roles are further conserved within the organization as can be seen through the fact that suicide bombings where the explosives were in a vehicle are overwhelmingly perpetrated by men, and women almost exclusively have the explosives strapped to their body. This is a reflection of Nigerian gender roles where women do not typically drive cars (Markovic).

The exploitation of gender roles also serves to Boko Haram’s advantage. For example, women can avoid being searched on the basis that they are women (Laura Sjoberg, Caron E). Furthermore, their clothes which include the Burqa, provide anonymity and make for the ideal concealing of explosives. In addition, women are often seen as nurturing, gentle and thus are less likely to arouse suspicion. Thus, women suicide bombers are often used for “soft” targets which include, mosques, markets and various other public places. This has led to a rise in fear of girls travelling alone as can be seen by mob beatings of young girls suspected to be carrying explosives when they actually were not. Boko Haram has adapted to this by deploying groups of women together when orchestrating an attack in order to attract even less suspicion. This shift in strategy which now employs female suicide bombers stems from avoiding government patrols which are less likely to search women due to their expected behavior because of their gender. It has enabled Boko Haram to take soldiers by surprise, as seen when the first female suicide bomber detonated in 2014 in Gombe. According to Bloom and Matfess, women also have a more symbolic role to play and allow Boko Haram to present itself as the savior of girls trapped in secular Western education and communities. Abubakar Shekau justified the kidnapping of the Chibok girls by saying that the girls shouldn’t have been going to school if they were at an age where they could be married, as this is a violation of Sharia law. Here the group presents itself as a savior for women by showing them the ways of Islam. Furthermore, Boko Haram is able to use these women as “bargaining chips” (Bloom, Matfess), releasing them in exchange for the release of some of their own soldiers who have been made prisoners of the Nigerian government.

This rise in female suicide bombers poses the question of whether they are coerced or willingly perpetrating these acts of violence. For Matfess and Bloom “many of the Boko Haram attacks were conducted by girls too young to have agency; others, such as rape victims and those subjected to psychological trauma, have been robbed of their autonomy to make that choice.” (Matfess and Bloom 8). Indeed, many of the girls used for suicide bombings are teenage girls or younger, some as young as seven years old. This fits in with their characterization as malleable due to their age, to be recruited, brainwashed, and then instructed to detonate in a public place. There are also testimonies from these girls that were caught and surrendered easily before detonating, which indicate that they were not willingly performing this act. The 13 year old Zaharau Babangida was arrested in the wake of a bomb blast in Kano at the city’s textile market. Babangida reports having been forced by her father to join Boko Haram and once in the organization was coerced into being a suicide bomber. She told reporters: “their leader resorted to threat and intimidation to obtain my consent. We were shown a deep hole where the leader of the group threatened to bury us alive at a point if any of us refused to play along, and at another time he picked a big gun and threatened to shoot anyone who fails to obey his command.” (Vanguard). This shows how many young girls, lacking agency and control over their situation have been coerced into being suicide bombers. Furthermore, in their article Nigéria: les femmes et Boko Haram, the International Crisis Group writes that many of the younger women appear to be drugged at the moment of the act, thus further reinforcing the appearance that they are not willing perpetrators of violence. Finally, George, Freedom, and Onuha write in their article Boko Haram’s use of Female Suicide Bombing in Nigeria that some girls are not even in control of their fate as they are remotely detonated. There is little evidence to support that women suicide bombers are fully conscious and in control during these acts, however, a few articles suggest that women of older ages are usually in control. Nevertheless, this view, which may be true for some women, must be nuanced through the lens of gender. Sjoberg explains in her chapter The Study of Women, Gender, and Terrorism, that we must reevaluate the one-dimensional view that women are coerced into terrorism or act for because of personal reasons. Instead, we must accept the fact that women participate in terrorism due to a complex set of factors, just like men, which differs from woman to woman just as it differs from man to man (Laura Sjoberg, Caron E, 232).

Women’s participation in Boko Haram is the result of individual, autonomous decisions, and no two women have the same motivation and these motivations may be the same as men’s. Sjoberg recognizes that this retheorization of terrorism through the lense of gender is difficult to accept as a woman being a terrorist is fundamentally going against gender norms prescribed to women as being peaceful, nurturing, and caring. As a result of this gender based analysis of women in Boko Haram it seems that not only can women be considered as independent actors in terrorism but they must be considered as such. Applying the lens of a gender allows us to understand how women in Boko Haram are recruited as well as their role and status within a terrorist organization which itself operates within a gendered framework. It is important to note that this doesn’t mean that all women are willingly becoming suicide bombers and committing acts of terrorism. As was demonstrated, many women and girls are coerced into such behavior. However, we must avoid harsh, gendered generalizations in motivations of women when it comes to joining the ranks and participating in Boko Haram’s activities. This observation of women being vulnerable to Boko Haram due to their marginalization in Nigerian society is hugely significant when considering the importance of gender equality and government policies targeting women’s education and health. The Lake Chad Basin area is in deep need of policies to increase gender equality to promote a more stable social fabric to prevent the women from joining Boko Haram, whether this may be voluntarily or through coercion. This goes through the sustainable development goals which include gender equality and access to education. Nigerian girls need to have access to education, participate in political and economic life as equals to men in order to prevent the spread of women’s recruitment in Boko Haram.

Works cited:

Idowu, A. A. “Women's Rights, Violence, and Gender Discrimination .” Gender and Power Relations in Nigeria, edited by Ronke Iyabowale Ako-Nai, Lexington Books, 2013, pp. 30–42.

Bloom, Mia, and Hilary Matfess. “Women as Symbols and Swords in Boko Haram's Terror.” PRISM, vol. 6, no. 1, 2016, pp. 104–121. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/26470435. Accessed 12 Nov. 2020.

George, Temilola A., and Freedom C Onuoha . “Boko Haram's Use of Female Suicide Bombing in Nigeria.” للدراسات الجزیرة مركز ,Aljazeera, 15 Mar. 2015, studies.aljazeera.net/ar/node/1398.

Laura Sjoberg, and Caron E. Gentry. Women, Gender, and Terrorism. University of Georgia Press, 2011. EBSCOhost, search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=e025xna&AN=398550&site=ehost-live&scope=site

Markovic, Vesna. “Suicide Squad: Boko Haram’s Use of the Female Suicide Bomber.” Women & Criminal Justice, vol. 29, no. 4-5, 2019, pp. 283–302., doi:10.1080/08974454.2019.1629153. “Nigeria: Security Forces Failed to Act on Warnings about Boko Haram Attack Hours before

Abduction of Schoolgirls.” Amnesty International, 20 Mar. 2018, www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/03/nigeria-abduction-of-schoolgirls-security-forces-failed -to-act-boko-haram/.

“Nigéria : Les Femmes Et Boko Haram.” Crisis Group, 28 Mar. 2017, www.crisisgroup.org/fr/africa/west-africa/nigeria/nigeria-women-and-boko-haram-insurgency. 12

Ola, Temitope P. “Understanding the Roles of Women in Boko Har Omen in Boko Haram’s Terrorism .” Journal of International Women's Studies, vol. 21, no. 1, Feb. 2020.

Rosenzweig, Sophie. BOKO HARAM: Quelle menace pour l’Afrique? BOKO HARAM: Quelle menace pour l’Afrique?, Jan. 2020, Reims, SciencesPo.

Vanguard. “How My Father Made Me a Suicide Bomber - 13-Yr Old Suspect.” Vanguard News, 25 Dec. 2014, www.vanguardngr.com/2014/12/father-made-suicide-bomber-13-yr-old-suspect/.