The North Korean nuclear crisis: a Cuban missile crisis in slow motion?

Author: Benjamin Lapping, The Australian National University

The contemporary North Korean crisis has been called the “Cuban missile crisis in slow motion” by John McCain, but does this historical analogy contain any merit? The two situations certainly contain similarities, but their differences must be analysed to avoid making false and potentially disastrous predictions.  In this essay I will be comparing the background, sparking, aims/objectives, management and immediate and long-term consequences of the two crises. For background, the inconclusive Korean War will be compared to the Bay of Pigs as a pretext for existing hostilities between the United States and North Korea/ Cuba. What would spark the Cuban Crisis would be the discovery of Soviet missile sites in Cuba, leading to the thirteen-day standoff, with this being distinct to the Korean Crisis which has various sparks across the decades. The aims of the United States in the Cuban crisis were to denuclearize Cuba while avoiding a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union, while Cuba aimed to stop a potential US invasion with nuclear deterrence. Such a situation exists today, as the US aims to denuclearise NK while avoiding nuclear war, and NK aims to preserve its sovereignty with nuclear deterrence. A key difference between the two, is the management of the crisis, as with the Cuban crisis, it would be Soviet missiles in Cuba, and Soviet talks with the US which de-escalated it. NK, however, has control over its missiles and is unlikely to give them up given the importance they have for its national defence. The Cuban Crisis would end with the denuclearization of Cuba and Turkey, in a deal made between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the USA. NK, however, remains a nuclear power, and taking away such power diplomatically remains highly improbable, ensuring the continuation of the Korean Cold war and further allowing time for a catastrophic error/miscommunication to happen.

The backgrounds of the Cuban and Korean Missile crises draw parallel. Following the 26th of July Movement victory in the Cuban revolution, the nation would grow ties with the Soviet Union and nationalise twenty-five billion dollars’ worth of private property[1]. This would antagonise the US into funding the Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Front (DRF), with the CIA training and arming Cubans who had fled the revolution, with the hopes that their invasion would spark a popular revolt against the socialist government[2].  The plan involved having the US air force and Navy support the naval invasion, however, President Kennedy would scale back the US’s involvement, leading to the DRF’s quick demise in the Bay of Pigs2. This act of aggression by the United States would only further cement Cuba’s relationship with the USSR and lead Khrushchev to conclude that building nuclear missile sites in Cuba was the best way to stop a US invasion[3] [4]. In this historical example, we see a weak state which feels threatened by the United States, turn to nuclear weapons in the hopes of deterring US aggression.

 The North Korean example has some similarities to this. The background of the Korean Crisis would be the Korean war itself, and the hostilities which followed it. The Korean war would have between 2-3 million civilians killed, around 10% of the population, and almost all-important infrastructure in the North destroyed[5]. This is a part of the reason why NK has such strong anti-American sentiments, with the state made propaganda posters showing imagery of US soldiers committing various atrocities and war crimes being followed with statements such as “Death to US imperialists! Our sworn enemy” and “Do not forget the US imperialist wolves”. The North Koreans, however, would feel relatively secure geo-politically, due to their close ties with the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and the USSR, that is until the normalisation of China-US relations in 1979 and the collapse of the USSR in 1991. It was only after 1991 would the DPRK feel insecure enough to pursue Nuclear Weapons in the name of national security, with them using their two nuclear reactors to develop nuclear weaponry in 1992, as reported by the CIA[6] [7]. Thus, like Cuba, North Korea would seek to make themselves a nuclear power due to their raised national insecurity.

This is what would spark the contemporary ongoing confrontation between the United States and North Korea, as like with Cuba, the United States would find the possession of nuclear weapons by an antagonistic nation undesirable. On October 16th, 1962, President Kennedy would learn of the presence of the Soviet Nuclear missiles in Cuba.  He had already learned of the importation of various military equipment by the Soviet Union into Cuba, with the Soviet ambassador claiming that these weapons were installed to protect Cuba from US invasion[8]. Kennedy would warn  Khrushchev on September 13th that, “If at any time the communist build-up in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security… or if Cuba should ever … become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies.”[9]. This demonstrates the American perspective, and once it was learnt that Cuba had potentially developed the facilities to launch “enough missiles to destroy New York, Chicago, and the other huge industrial cities, not to mention the little village of Washington,”[10], they would panic and enter DEFCON 3, thereby beginning the Cuban Missile Crisis.

However, upon learning of North Korea’s steps towards creating nuclear weapons in 1992, the US would not panic as they did for Cuba in 1962. This is where McCain’s statement that the Korean crisis is the “Cuban crisis in slow motion” holds. NK after a troubled inspection of their nuclear facilities would threaten to leave the NPT[11], leading to the Agreed Framework Treaty (1994), which had NK remain a party in the NPT in exchange for economic assistance from the US11. The treaty was largely dysfunctional, with it breaking down by 2002, and NK leaving the NPT in 2003[12]. This would spark the creation of the Six-Party Talks which aimed to find a peaceful resolution to the security threat which is a nuclear-armed NK. The talks would, however, fail to prevent NK’s nuclear weapons research, with North Korea announcing it had successfully carried out their first nuclear weapons explosions test in 2006[13]. This would establish North Korea as a nuclear power, with them continuing to develop their missile and nuclear capabilities despite the economic sanctions imposed on them. One of the reasons why America would almost start a nuclear war over the Cuban crisis, and not treat the Koreans with the same level of hostility, can be put down to distance and nuclear capability, as Cuba was on the American doorstep, and Korea across the Pacific Ocean, with it being a recent development that NK has the capacity to potentially strike the US with its missiles[14].

The aim of the United States in both crises is the denuclearisation of the state which threatens their national security, and the motivation of the nuclearizing state was to deter a US invasion. Following the Bay of Pigs invasion, it would seem obvious to Khrushchev that if they did not put the missiles in Cuba, the Americans would eventually invade and overthrow the Communist regime[15]. However, Castro would be reluctant to accept the missiles, as “when Castro requested Soviet military aid, he meant guns, tanks, planes, and land mines rather than nuclear missiles.”, and was opposed to installing them secretly16.   The Americans would find the installation of Soviet missiles an intrusion into there sphere of influence, Dean Rusk calling it “an intrusion in the Western Hemisphere.”[16]. The ExComm would prioritise the removal of the Cuban Nuclear Missiles as their primary goal, with the debate being whether they should solve this diplomatically or militarily, with the fear being that if they tried this diplomatically, they could give the Soviets and Cubans enough time to install the Nuclear Missiles18. The ExComm all “agreed that the United States could not idly stand by while the Soviets threatened U.S. security and put the lives of millions of Americans at risk”.[17].

The North Koreans justify their continued development of nuclear weapons and missiles based on national security, arguing that Libya, shortly after removing their “weapons of mass destruction” would have their government toppled by NATO[18]. When asked, “Kim’s spokespeople have stressed that he will not suffer the fate of Saddam or Qaddafi, both of whom gave up their nuclear programs only to be attacked later by the United States”[19]. According to realism, a state’s main priority is the perseveration of itself, and so it remains logical that North Korea develops these weapons to mitigate the US’s clear military superiority over them[20], as just a single nuclear missile striking a major US city would be an unacceptable loss for the US government. 

However, the main difference between the two crises would be how it was managed. Castro, despite his importance as a major player in the crisis, would not be consulted during the final peace talks[21]. The missiles in Cuba were Soviet missiles, and so Kennedy would talk with Khrushchev rather than Castro to avoid the outbreak of nuclear war. The deal made would have the US remove its missiles in Turkey and swear to not invade the island, in exchange for the dismantlement of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. This would be in the national interest of the Soviet Union, as it would remove some of the nuclear threat they felt from the US. Castro was reportedly frustrated by this outcome, feeling that his nation had been made “a pawn on the worlds chessboard” [22]. Castro would state that “I cannot agree with Khrushchev promising Kennedy to pull out his rockets without the slightest regard to the indispensable approval of the Cuban government.”22.

This remains relevant to the current North Korean missile crisis as NK has control over their missiles and nuclear warheads. The effect of this is that NK will not be as easily denuclearised as Cuba was. What NK is aiming for in its talks with the US, is not the removal of Nuclear weapons from the Korean Crisis, but instead “acceptance of its nuclear power status”[23]. The time it took to make Cuba a nuclear armed power was mere weeks, NK took decades, with their being multiple international organisations and agreements aiming, and ultimately failing to prevent NK becoming a nuclear power.  As it stands currently, “there is no process in place to contain, much less roll back or eliminate, North Korean nuclear weapons.”[24]. What we have currently is a “North Korea which mistakenly believes it is invulnerable to retaliation due to its nascent nuclear capabilities”[25]. Now, as nuclear weapons are seen as essential for the national defence of NK, due to their deterrence factor, and as they have control over their weapons, unlike the Cubans, the future management of this crisis will be vastly different to the management seen during the Cuban Crisis, as NK cannot be expected to voluntarily cripple their national security.

This is where McCain’s analogy breaks down again, as this key military/political difference between the Cuban and Korean Crisis will lead to different outcomes. The Cuban Crisis had a peaceful outcome, yet the same cannot be said for NK. It is thought that when Donald Trump realises that North Korea has been utterly defying the US, he will return to the “fire and fury talk”[26]. Kim has been compared to Castro, as both have surrounded themselves with yes-men, and Donald Trump holding only a fraction of the predictability JFK had[27]. “North Korea, South Korea, and the United States are all poised to launch pre-emptive strikes. In such an unstable situation, the risk that an accident, a false warning, or a misperceived military exercise could lead to a war is alarmingly high.”26. Now, as denuclearizing NK diplomatically remains highly improbable, a prolonged cold war between NK and the US will be the outcome, that is until either side makes a mistake and perceives the enemy to be making a hostile attack on them, potentially leading to an all-out nuclear war. The longer the cold war lasts, the more time for catastrophic failure/miscommunication there is.

In conclusion, McCain’s statement that the Korean crisis is the Cuban missile crisis in slow motion, has some merit, but holds some significant flaws. The background for these crises can be easily compared, as the US would start each crisis with hostile relationships with both Cuba and NK. What would spark each crisis can be compared, as the United States would find an opponent of theirs becoming a nuclear power an unacceptable arrangement, however it would still be decades before NK   developed the capacity to strike America as Cuba could, causing America to have a comparatively more passive reaction to NK’s slow nuclear developments. For Cuba, installing the missile sites was a way to deter US invasion, as it is for NK, while the objective for the United States was/is to denuclearise these states due to the national security threat they impose. The biggest difference for these crises is their management, as the way the Cuban crisis was de-escalated was through direct negation’s between Khrushchev and JFK. Kim, Unlike Castro, has control of the nuclear weapons in his nation, and is highly unlikely to give them up. This is why the outcome of each crisis will be different, as NK’s nuclear weapons will not be peacefully removed, ensuring a prolonged cold war which give time for either the US and NK to enter a devastating war by accident on account of computer errors/miscommunication.