Turkey’s Path to European Integration

Author: Aryan Shresth, The Australian National University

Introduction

Turkey’s relationship with European integration and Europe itself has often been tumultuous and full of uncertainty. The country’s stance towards the continent has alternated between genuine admiration and open hostility, and despite being the EU’s oldest associate member, the result of Turkey’s drive to EU membership remains unclear. This essay will present a detailed examination of the evolution of relations between Turkey and European integration and analyse the effects of Turkey’s ongoing membership application to the European Union (EU) on Turkish domestic politics. It will be structured in such a way as to offer an in-depth breakdown of each major issue in Turkish politics that was significantly impacted by the process of European integration.

Relationship with Greece/Cyprus

In consideration of the fact that the Turkish stance on Cyprus has influenced and was influenced by Turkey’s relations with Greece to such a significant degree, the two issues will be discussed together for the purposes of this essay. Historically, diplomatic relations between Turkey and Greece have always been fraught with tension, owning in no small part to the fact that the modern state of Greece was only established at the Treaty of Edirne in September 1829, when the Russian Empire forced the Ottoman Empire to recognize Greece’s liberation and independence from Ottoman rule.[1] Even after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and the proclamation of a Turkish Republic on 29 October 1923, relations with Greece remained extremely strained, with the Greco-Turkish War having ended a mere year earlier and accusations of various atrocities and ethnic cleansing in that conflict still dominating public discourse in both nations.[2]

Thus, it is of little surprise that Greece has often sought to disrupt Turkey’s attempts to accede to European institutions and organizations. In fact, the numerous political disputes that emerged between Turkey and Greece over the history of relations between both nations have been seen by many experts as one of the major stumbling blocks to Turkish candidacy.[3] One of the most contentious disputes in Greco-Turkish relations was the status of Cyprus, a small island in the Eastern Mediterranean with a population comprising of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. While both nations had long claimed to possess sovereignty over the island, this controversy threatened to escalate into a fully-fledged crisis when in 1964 President-Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus attempted to amend the constitution in order to curtail the autonomy and representation of the Turkish minority. In response, Turkish Prime Minister İnönü warned Makarios that Turkey would invade the island if the Cypriot government did not back down but was prevented from doing so by US President Johnson who forbid the use of US military aid in any invasion.[4] However, the crisis flared up again in 1967 when a military junta seized power in Athens and encouraged the Greek nationalists in Cyprus to agitate for enosis, or union with mainland Greece. While war was averted then, on 15 July 1974, the Greek dictator Ioannidis ordered a coup against Makarios by the Cypriot national guard, who subsequently declared enosis. This forced Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit to order Turkish forces to invade Cyprus, who proceeded to occupy approximately 40% of the island’s territory. On 13 February 1975, the Turkish Cypriot authorities declared the foundation of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.[5]

The struggle for Cyprus between Turkey and Greece might seem irrelevant to Turkey’s path to European integration initially. However, following Greece’s accession to the European Community (EC) on 1 January 1981, disputes between Greece and Turkey suddenly also affected the entire European project. A mere five months following Greece’s admission into the EC, Turkey’s membership in the Council of Europe was suspended in May 1981 as a partial result of pressure from Greek representatives. In fact, political relations with the EC only recovered in 1983, when EC leaders had grown frustrated by the Greek policy of obstructing Turkey’s integration process.[6] As for the problem of Cyprus itself, it has come to be regarded by many leading scholars as “by far the most serious crisis in Turkey’s foreign relations”.[7] For example, while the EU summit in Luxembourg in December 1997 recognized Turkey’s right to accede to the Union, it stipulated that negotiations could only begin once certain political conditions had been met. These conditions consisted of the so-called “Copenhagen criteria”, which mandated that Turkey cooperate with international organizations such as the UN over Cyprus and submit its dispute with Greece concerning the Aegean Sea to the International Court of Justice.[8] Considering the virulent nationalistic sentiments that have arisen in Turkey considering Cyprus and Turkey’s position in the Eastern Mediterranean, it is politically difficult for any Turkish government to make compromises on these issues.

Additionally, despite the best efforts of some of the international community’s most renowned diplomats, a political solution to the Cypriot problem still appears to be a distant prospect. The most recent attempt to mediate between the Turkish and Greek inhabitants of Cyprus was the Annan Plan which was formulated by the UN secretary-general of the time. It called for the reunification of the island and the formation of a bi-zonal federal structure for the new government. On 24 April 2004, it was proposed to Turkish and Greek Cypriots in two separate and simultaneous referenda. While the Turkish government wholeheartedly supported the plan, and received the votes of 65% of Turkish Cypriots, the plan was voted down by 74% of Greek Cypriots. Thus, it was only the Greek Cypriot-governed Republic of Cyprus which gained membership in the EU on 1 May 2004. Within three years of acceding to the EU, the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) had already achieved two major goals which threatened to derail Turkey’s membership bid: firstly, the ROC vetoed the European Commission’s attempted to increase direct trade and financial assistance to the Turkish Cypriots in order to lower economic inequality on the island; and secondly, the ROC persuaded other EU member states to demand Turkish recognition of the ROC as the one and only legitimate government of Cyprus in its entirety.[9] Thus, Turkey’s insistence on recognizing the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as a legitimate and independent state is not only a major point of contention in relations between Turkey and the ROC: it now also poses major problems for Turkey’s bid for EU membership.

However, in more recent years Turkey’s relations with Greece have made a major recovery. By the late 1990s, the artists, writers and intellectuals of both nations had been increasing their contact with their counterparts for some time. In fact, Turkish Prime Minister Yilmaz had met with Greek Prime Minister Simitis in November 1997 and the Chief of the Turkish General Staff had met his Greek opposite number in April 1998.[10] Nonetheless, an even bigger breakthrough came in 1999, when Greek Foreign Minister Theo Pangalos was replaced by George Papandreou, who was seem as being more moderate in his stance on Turkey. Greece’s immediate humanitarian response and provision of aid in response to the devastating earthquake in Turkey that occurred on 17 August 1999 also represented a major turning point. The participation of the Greek Red Cross and other volunteer organizations in the recovery effort received plaudits from the Turkish public and was widely covered by the Turkish press.[11] In the years that followed, contacts in the realm of sports increased at a rapid pace. These culminated in the submission of a joint bid proposed by Greece and Turkey together to host the European football championships in 2008. And in a major policy shift from Greece’s old position on Turkish accession, Greece came out strongly in support of Turkey’s future membership of the EU in 2002.[12]

Therefore, while Greece had been one of the major obstacles to further Turkish integration into Europe, it has now become on its supporters. EU integration itself has some responsibility for this policy change. Before the 1990s, Greek foreign policy had been to persuade other EU member states to support its position vis-à-vis its dispute with Turkey. However, this policy detracted from its bargaining power on other important issues. Overtime, this diminished Greece’s ability to negotiate effectively on other EU policies such as structural funds, the euro and justice and home affairs. As a result, Greek officials were compelled to soften its stance on Turkish accession.[13] Thus, EU integration may have paved the way for further European integration, as it allowed the EU to take Turkey’s membership bid more seriously.

Democratic Governance, Human Rights & Islam

While early forms of European integration such as the European Coal and Steel Community were primarily aimed to facilitate economic cooperation, the evolution of the European project has resulted in a union of political, social and cultural factors as well. The question of whether Turkey can accept and assimilate the liberal norms prized in Europe is a major issue in Turkey’s bid to join the EU. In particular, the struggle between Islamism and secularism have characterized Turkish domestic politics for decades. During the 1970-80s, most members of the Islamic elite were highly opposed to Turkey’s attempts to join the EC as they felt that deeper integration with Europe would ensure the entrenchment of liberal democracy and secularism in Turkey. However, following the brief military intervention in 1997 which imposed restrictions on “all forms of Islamist expression in the public sphere”, many Islamic groups became vocal proponents of Western liberal values such as freedom of expression and freedom of religion.[14]  As a result, these “post-Islamists” sought to use Western ideals and institutions, the EU in particular, as an ally in their struggle against Kemalist pressures in Turkey, which were seen by many Islamic groups to be overly restrictive towards religious practises and even anti-Islam.

Namely, Ihsan Dagi argues that “they call on the secular state authorities to bring Westernization to its logical end, i.e., to fulfil the requirements for membership in the European Union”. A clear example of how Western values are being used by Islamic groups to defend their interests can be seen in the debate in Turkey concerning the headscarf. Following the military coup which occurred on 27 February 1997, Islamist prime minister Necmettin Erbakan resigned and his coalition government was disbanded. Faced with this loss of political influence and decision-making power, Islamists feared that the newly-installed secular state authorities would move to ban headscarves on university campuses, which they saw as a symbol of jihad against the values of the Turkish Republic’s founder; Mustafa Kemal. However, instead of invoking the obligations of Islam as a defence, many Islamists invoked references to the idea of universal human rights expressed in many international human rights conventions, including the European Convention on Human Rights.[15]

Thusly, it can be seen that the European ideals of human rights and liberal democracy have not been rejected by Turkey’s Islamic elite: in fact, it has been embraced by Islamist groups as a useful tool to safeguard their religious sensibilities and practises. However, in the years following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, there has been a growing suspicion in the Western public towards Muslims and problems they may face while trying to integrate into Europe. In many EU member states, there is a perception that Islam is fundamentally incompatible with being part of the West, and that it is far from likely that a predominantly Muslim country can be a part of the EU socially and culturally.[16] Moreover, leading politicians in Europe have publicly expressed doubts as to whether Turkey can be culturally accepted as part of the US. For example, German Chancellor Kohl publicly states that he did not consider Turkey to be a European country. On 4 March 1997, the Christian Democrats in the European Parliament officially declared that Turkey could not be seriously considered for EU membership.

These remarks infuriated the Turkish public, resulted in the severance of contacts between Turkey and the EU and caused EU-Turkish relations to reach an all-time low. In fact, Turkish Prime Minister Yilmaz went so far as to say that Germany was in search of Lebensraum in eastern Europe, a term which evoked Nazi ideology, and stated that Chancellor Kohl was an enemy of the Turks.[17] The ferocity of the Turkish reaction persuaded many European leaders to seek rapprochement with Turkey, and resulted in the EU reaffirming its commitment to Turkey’s future membership at the Helsinki summit in December 1999. Additionally, the newly-elected German Chancellor Schroeder claimed that “enlargement is necessary both politically and morally” for the EU.[18] However, this constructivist view that the EU is responsible for the expansion of the liberal community is not universally held across the EU. The rise of Eurosceptic parties such as France’s National Rally and the Netherland’s Party for Freedom has threatened the integrity of the European project and have exposed the various political and cultural differences between the various EU member states. Considering that Turkey is even more culturally different to European nations in many ways, the prospect of Turkish membership in the EU appears to be as elusive as ever. 

Additionally, while the military coup of 1980 which temporarily severed ties with the EU has been consigned to the history books, concerns over Turkey’s democratic governance remain.[19] The failed coup attempt of 15 July 2016 dramatically worsened EU-Turkey relations and was coupled with increasingly anti-European and anti-Western rhetoric of Turkish President Erdogan’s government. Nonetheless, the results of the April 2017 constitutional referendum also how that almost 50% of the Turkish public oppose the growth of authoritarianism in the country. In addition, many Turkish citizens believe that the EU can be a normative actor with the potential to constrain the growing powers of the country’s leadership, with particular emphasis on President Erdogan who has explicitly opposed some of the rulings of the Turkish Constitutional Court on the freedom of expression in the past.[20]

Conclusion

When Turkey became an associate member of the EC when it signed the Ankara Treaty on 12 September 1963, few could have predicted the tumultuous and often fractious relationship that would develop between Turkey and the EU in the decades that followed. While Turkey received candidacy status at the EU summit at Helsinki in 1999, the conflicts and disputes of the past continue to influence the politics of both Turkey and the EU in the present. While Turkey’s relations with Greece have recovered to a remarkable degree, the question of Cyprus continues to pose problems for Turkey’s bid for EU membership. And while many thought that democratic governance and liberal values had finally been established in Turkey, the events of recent years have provided suitable grounds to cast doubt on these claims. Consequently, while it is uncertain whether Turkey will ever achieve the EU membership many of its leaders have coveted for so long, it is undoubtable that the process of EU integration has had remarkable effects on Turkey, and that Turkey’s bid for membership has had profound effects on the EU.