The geoeconomics of the Belt and Road: Navigating global development amid US-China competition

Mar 5

Date: 26-12-2020 GSI Internal Research and Analysis Group Author: Prudence Luttrell

Introduction

China under Xi Jinping is increasingly looking to reshape the international order to expand its global influence. It often sees the post-war liberal order as constructed without its input (and largely in service of the US’ agenda), and seeks to circumvent key norms held at the international level—such as those surrounding human rights, economic development and state sovereignty—to better pursue its national interests. Therefore, the key to navigating the challenges to global order in 2021 and beyond will be an improved understanding of China’s rising confidence and activities, and the formulation of careful policy based on an expanded view of its national interest.

This report will first introduce the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and examine briefly the intentions behind Chinese regional engagement. Next, it will consider the risks and rewards for participating states, presenting an overview of the national security calculations states will need to make when engaging with such projects. Finally, it will explore potential policy responses for partner states, and suggest geopolitical trends likely to affect regional development over the next decade.

Summary of key findings

Finding A: Concerns over ‘debt trap diplomacy’ are overblown, however there are credible risks in engaging with BRI projects. Namely the risk of debt distress, entanglement in geopolitical tensions, exacerbated local corruption, and developmental and environmental harm.
Finding B: The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership is likely to solidify Chinese economic dominance in the Indo Pacific, challenging the designs of India and the United States while improving prospects for trade and investment for the world’s poorest nations.
Finding C: Beijing has ruled out mass bailouts, but appears willing to renegotiate the terms of existing agreements where host states are struggling to make repayments.
Finding D: The PRC's close involvement in the development of rail, road and sea links opens the possibility for preferential treatment and access to critical infrastructure in ways disadvantageous to Western interests.

New Silk Road: intentions and misconceptions

Beijing seeks to influence international institutions, “pushing for cooperation in areas that [serve] Chinese interests” and “blocking initiatives that [harm] its interests.” [2] In particular, China seeks to “[carve] out some space for its own dominion”, positioning itself as a leader of the global South in trade and development. [3] [4] But Chinese actions on the global stage are not only informed by strategic and economic interests, but also by ideological considerations—namely, the ruling Party’s political desire for a “great revival” of the Chinese nation. [5] An aspect of Chinese foreign policy particularly worth watching is its trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative, a system of economic corridors and maritime trade routes designed to boost global trade through infrastructure projects, while supporting Chinese economic and political influence. Indicative of China’s ambitions of leadership in regional development, the BRI reaches well into Asia, Europe, Africa and beyond.

The programme has received a mix of praise and criticism, with striking differences in perceptions across the more than 130 countries involved. [6] The initiative remains very misunderstood, however. While some have characterised it as an elaborate ‘debt trap’ designed to coerce weaker states into conceding critical assets, it appears the BRI is not nearly as well-coordinated or deliberate as such critiques would suggest. [7] [8] “The institutions delivering China’s development financing are … fragmented, poorly coordinated and ill-equipped to execute a top-down strategy. Top leaders and central agencies attempt to shape the BRI’s overall direction through, often vague, policy statements and broad commitments. But detailed implementation is left to other agencies.” [9]

While debt trap concerns are overblown, there are nonetheless ample risks in engaging with BRI projects. This is in large part because Chinese loans generally carry higher interest rates with shorter maturities, compared with loans from high-income nations and the World Bank, for example. This combination can mean that debts may require servicing long before projects begin to generate a return, increasing the likelihood of debt distress. (As a result, such loans are refinanced frequently, with national assets sometimes used as collateral.) Indeed, it is features like this high interest rate-short maturity combination that “[give] Chinese state-controlled banks the confidence to lend to poor countries” in the first place. [10] The BRI is also heavily influenced by domestic interests, though. As part of its long-term reform agenda, China is using transnational trade as a means to address persisting domestic developmental challenges, such as the integration of border regions including Yunnan and Xinjiang. [11] Thus, China is able to stimulate its own economy through global development initiatives by supporting state-owned enterprises (SOEs) starved by a lack of domestic demand.

Engagement risks

Participation in the BRI carries a number of dangers, the most obvious being that of financial crisis. “Chinese loans violate several international lending best practices involving procurement, transparency, and dispute settlement.” [12] Many projects are hastily planned and sometimes implemented for political purposes by corrupt officials, meaning that evaluations of projected costs and revenue are often inaccurate. [13] Low operating returns have led to debt distress in a number of economies, from Zambia to Montenegro, which in turn has exacerbated US-China geostrategic competition through developments such as the leasing of the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka and the establishment of a Chinese naval base in Djibouti (where public debt is at 80% of GDP, much of it owed to China). Already, more than 270 BRI projects in the Indo-Pacific alone have been halted due to concerns about economic and other costs, reflecting the inadequate planning of many BRI ventures. [14] [15] Similarly, some partner nations fear the potential for Chinese neo-colonialism, with newly-developed infrastructure used for the export of raw materials (rather than finished goods) to China, undermining local industry. [16] And, as long as the BRI appears in large part a vehicle for recirculating wealth inside China for the benefit of domestic raw materials producers, construction companies and labourers, the risk of economic coercion will remain in host nation consciousnesses.

Secondly, a lack of transparency, paired with often rife corruption in loan recipient nations, means that projects are at higher risk of not meeting local needs. [17] BRI loans differ from World Bank loans, for example, in that they lack an open and competitive bidding process. [18] Largely delivered by Chinese SOEs, BRI projects also often employ Chinese labour and materials, and therefore may not engage local firms or facilitate skills transfer. [19] Inadequate consultation procedures can mean that projects undermine local communities’ interests. This has been the case with the China-financed Coca Codo Sinclair Hydroelectric Dam in Ecuador, for example, which, when operated, floods farmlands, devastating local industry and even leading to the deaths of farmers. [20] Additionally, SOEs’ relative inexperience overseas, paired with lacking systems of governance, mean that Chinese development finance is at times poorly planned and implemented. [21] Aside from risking national sovereignty and economic security, sensitive BRI projects with potential military (or even dual civil-military) applications can lead to negative geopolitical consequences, especially if projects place a country at the centre of US-China competition. [22] For instance, digital components of the Belt and Road such as the export of facial recognition technology may be perceived as compromising the security of local critical infrastructure. In particular, the Digital Silk Road element of the BRI risks exacerbating problems of forced technology transfer, cyber espionage, global internet fragmentation and the export of surveillance tools. [23] Adverse geopolitical consequences may also arise due to increased Chinese political influence in partner countries. As the BRI is heavily oriented toward infrastructure—rather than human capital, for example—projects produce a lasting physical presence and promote goodwill between nations, tangibly increasing Chinese soft power. [24] Similarly, despite the BRI’s purported commitment to free trade, further integration with China risks exposure to coercive diplomacy. [25]

Finally, China’s poor human rights record implicates its lending and investment activities, with Human Rights Watch reporting that China consistently fails to conduct adequate social and environmental impact assessments, negatively affecting local livelihoods and contributing to political corruption, environmental degradation and labour rights violations in developing states. [26] [27] US lending, for example, to a certain extent requires transparency, compliance mechanisms, prioritisation of human capital (through consideration of the Sustainable Development Goals, including environmental provisions), and measures to prevent bribery and corruption in recipient states. [28] [29] However, Belt and Road loans are conspicuously lacking in similar conditions. This reduces bureaucracy and cuts operational costs (and therefore makes such loans an attractive option for developing nations), but these programs often fail to adequately protect against social and environmental harms in recipient states as a result. Moreover, amid growing concerns around global warming, Chinese investment in fossil fuel infrastructure, and the ecological destruction arising from large-scale projects, may produce destabilising civil unrest.

Policy options: from avoidance to cautious engagement

Where considerations of security may once have been restricted to the realms of national sovereignty—entailing territorial integrity and political autonomy—and economic prosperity, in the 21st century, issues of global health, human rights, resource scarcity, crime and ideology are all considered key facets of the security mosaic. [30] In this way, states in 2021 must consider their national interests in light of these broader considerations, and assess the risks of participation in programmes such as the BRI. [31]

While great powers can project influence globally and regionally, coercing smaller rivals and empowering allies to achieve foreign policy goals, weaker powers generally must rely on institutions to represent their interests. This is complicated by the fact that more powerful states may seek to steer or co-opt these organisations. But even though small and middle powers lack the capacity to entrepreneur their own ambitious development initiatives to rival the BRI, they can certainly engage more strategically with China, cognisant of the risks. Ferchen and Perera write, “[w]hile most critiques of the debt trap narrative have largely focused on China’s strategic intentions, other observers have noted that Beijing’s partners are strategic players in their own right with an overlooked degree of agency. Yet as valuable as these critiques have been in terms of pointing out the flaws in the simplified, politicised debt trap narrative, the fact remains that a worrying amount of China’s development finance has proven unsustainable.” [32]

Economic integration is likely to have expanding implications for national security, and decisions surrounding risk management will therefore fall further under the purview of foreign policy establishments. Rather than predatory lending, high-risk ventures are largely a result of poor governance, political corruption and a lack of due diligence on the part of the loan recipient. [33] But, while evidence of deliberate ‘debt trap diplomacy’ may be lacking, the risk remains, and examples from Sri Lanka to Malaysia suggest the caution with which states will need to proceed when entering regional trade agreements. [34] Indeed, some states will judge that the overall risks of integration outweigh potential benefits.

(A) Avoidance:

The first policy option available to states sceptical of the BRI is avoidance, which may involve vocal opposition, as is the case with India. [35] New Delhi has stated that the BRI—with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as its flagship initiative—violates Indian sovereignty, as the CPEC passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (disputed territory). [36] In addition to harbouring fears that BRI projects risk generating unsustainable debt, exacerbating corruption and contributing to environmental degradation, India is wary of China’s increased military presence in its neighbourhood, especially given the ongoing border clashes between India and China; India has also criticised China’s lack of transparency, compliance requirements and consultation with local stakeholders in delivering BRI projects. [37] Avoidance as a strategy has the advantage of reducing vulnerability to economic coercion, but obviously precludes any developmental benefits. In addition to economic isolation, unengaged states lack access to the diplomatic arrangements attached to financing initiatives for infrastructure development. This impedes regional integration, hinders a state's ability to diversify the financing instruments applied to sovereign infrastructure development, and limits access to hedging as a potential geopolitical strategy.

(B) Contract renegotiation:

Conversely, states may seek to recalibrate engagement on their own terms. Some states have had to renegotiate ill-conceived BRI agreements due to local corruption and poor planning. [38] Former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed was forced to renegotiate and cancel BRI contracts, for instance, when it was revealed in 2015 that his predecessor Najib Razak had embezzled $4.5 billion in funds ‘intended’ for BRI projects (the East Coast Railway Link and two gas pipelines). [39] These BRI loans were deliberately inflated to siphon more money into Najib’s pockets via the 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB), a state fund set up by Najib himself supposedly to facilitate foreign investment-fuelled development. But it is crucial to note that “Chinese involvement was … solicited by corrupt Malaysian elites, rather than [part of] a deliberate Chinese strategy.” [40] "Malaysia’s approach to China-backed projects appears to have changed significantly [under Mahathir]. Previous contracts and projects are now scrutinised under a more critical lens, and government investigations continue to reveal evidence of corruption.” [41]

(C) Cautious engagement:

Finally, states which choose to participate in the BRI can select a strategy of cautious engagement, wherein careful calculations are made regarding risk appetite and project feasibility. Kliman et al. suggest seven positive criteria against which BRI projects may be assessed by partner states, for example. [42] They argue that projects should:

uphold the sovereignty of partner nations,
be transparent in terms of project delivery and reporting,
be financially sustainable (balancing debt obligations with projected revenues),
engage local enterprise and labour, and involve skills transfer for the benefit of the local economy,
avoid placing partner countries at the centre of US-China geostrategic competition, while safeguarding critical infrastructure (such as telecommunications) avoiding the implication of dual civil-military capabilities, and
adopt measures to prevent corruption.

Germany provides a useful example of efforts to pragmatically calibrate engagement with Chinese investment, for instance, recognising the need for both stronger monitoring mechanisms and a unified European response (addressing the first three criteria in particular). “Germany was also one of the initiators (besides France and Italy) of a broader legislative project at the EU level that aims to provide a solid legal footing in EU law for monitoring and restricting state-directed foreign investments in sensitive European industries, with the primary aim of controlling Chinese FDI.” [43] In this way, German policymakers hope to safeguard critical national infrastructure and defend against foreign interference by stringently screening investments, allowing them to safely take advantage of valuable Chinese capital at a time of depressed investment spending across Europe. [44] This offers a model of calculated participation for other partners wary of the potential risks of engagement with BRI projects that are at times inadequately planned and implemented. However, it should be noted, for example, that Germany has received criticism from European partners for the ‘hasty’ conclusion of the EU-China investment deal, given growing slave labour concerns and the deal’s minimal labour rights provisions. [45] In this way, it is clear that human rights concerns will continue to influence partners’ appetite for Chinese FDI to a greater extent in the coming decades.

Conclusion

As the region grows increasingly contested over the next decade, BRI partner nations should develop domestic risk assessment and anti-corruption capabilities, so that they might reap the benefits of participation in Chinese development programmes while mitigating unsustainable debt burdens. Worldwide, debt distress is expected to worsen as a result of the ongoing recession, and BRI partners may turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or smaller lenders for support in servicing debt repayments. [57] The IMF should therefore promote transparency and higher lending standards to improve Chinese practices. Already, China has agreed to a moratorium on debt servicing for developing nations in 2020, but debt burdens will continue to rise as interest accrues. [58] Instead of seeking to constrain Chinese development, regional partners should focus on encouraging sustainable lending practices, and supporting the IMF to cooperate with China in this regard. [59]

For example, the US in 2020 launched its new Development Finance Corporation, but this is unlikely to directly compete with China’s less-regulated, comparatively infrastructure-oriented programmes. [60] In order to bolster its position, therefore, the US under Biden should renew engagement with the region, offering sustainable loans that support political stability, good governance, environmental protections and human rights protections. The World Bank and IMF should support efforts to improve transparency and economic viability through increased monitoring and advocacy. Finally, China’s strategic rivals should take care not to misidentify the BRI as a deliberate tool of economic coercion (which is likely to harm relations unnecessarily), while remaining cognisant of the BRI’s soft power potential and China’s geopolitical interest in de-securitising BRI discourse. [61]

Endnotes

[1] cf. Courtney J. Fung, China and intervention at the UN Security Council: Reconciling status (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).

[2] Mingjiang Li, “Rising from within: China’s search for a multilateral world and its implications for Sino-US relations,” Global Governance 17, no. 3 (2011): 331–351.

[3] Nadège Rolland, “An à la carte strategy,” The Lowy Institute, n.d., https://interactives.lowyinstitute.org/features/china-rules-based-order/articles/an-a-la-carte-strategy/

[4] Daniel Tobin, “Rewiring the global order,” The Lowy Institute, n.d., https://interactives.lowyinstitute.org/features/china-rules-based-order/articles/rewiring-the-global-order/

[5] Elizabeth Economy, The third revolution: Xi Jinping and the new Chinese state (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

[6] Alicia García-Herrero and Jianwei Xu, "Countries’ perceptions of China’s Belt and Road Initiative: A big data analysis,” Bruegel, February 6, 2019, https://www.bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/WP-2019-01final.pdf

[7] Roland Rajah, Alexandre Dayant and Jonathan Pryke, “Ocean of debt? Belt and Road and debt diplomacy in the Pacific,” The Lowy Institute, October 21, 2019, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/ocean-debt-belt-and-road-and-debt-diplomacy-pacific

[8] Mark Akpaninyie, “China’s ‘debt diplomacy’ is a misnomer. Call it ‘crony diplomacy,” The Diplomat, March 12, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/chinas-debt-diplomacy-is-a-misnomer-call-it-crony-diplomacy/

[9] Shahar Hameiri, “Debunking the myth of China’s ‘debt-trap diplomacy’,” The Interpreter, September 9, 2020, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/debunking-myth-china-s-debt-trap-diplomacy

[10] Maria Abi-Habib and Keith Bradsher, “Poor countries borrowed billions from China. They can’t pay it back,” The New York Times, May 18, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/18/business/china-loans-coronavirus-belt-road.html

[11] Christian Ploberger, Political economic perspectives of China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Reshaping regional integration (Milton: Routledge, 2019).

[12] Dylan Gerstel, “It’s a (debt) trap! Managing China-IMF cooperation across the Belt and Road,” CSIS, October 17, 2018, https://www.csis.org/npfp/its-debt-trap-managing-china-imf-cooperation-across-belt-and-road

[13] Matt Ferchen and Anarkalee Perera, “Why unsustainable Chinese infrastructure deals are a two-way street,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, July, 23, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/7-15-19_Ferchen_Debt_Trap.pdf

[14] Tanner Greer, “One Belt, One Road, one big mistake,” Foreign Policy, December 6, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/06/bri-china-belt-road-initiative-blunder/

[15] Mark Akpaninyie, “China’s ‘debt diplomacy’ is a misnomer. Call it ‘crony diplomacy”

[16] Rafiq Dossani, Jennifer Bouey and Keren Zhu, “Demystifying the Belt and Road Initiative: A clarification of its key features, objectives and impacts,” RAND Corporation, May 2020, https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WR1338.html

[17] Elaine K Dezenski, “Below the Belt and Road,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, May 6, 2020, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2020/05/04/below-the-belt-and-road/

[18] Rafiq Dossani, Jennifer Bouey and Keren Zhu, “Demystifying the Belt and Road Initiative: A clarification of its key features, objectives and impacts”

[19] Daniel Kliman, Rush Doshi, Kristine Lee and Zack Cooper, “Grading China’s Belt and Road," Center for a New American Security, April 2019, https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/CNAS+Report_China+Belt+and+Road_final.pdf

[20] Nicholas Casey and Clifford Krauss, "It doesn’t matter if Ecuador can afford this dam. China still gets paid,” The New York Times, December 24, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/24/world/americas/ecuador-china-dam.html

[21] Lee Jones and Shahar Hameiri, “Debunking the myth of ‘debt-trap diplomacy’: How recipient countries shape China’s Belt and Road Initiative," Chatham House, August 19, 2020, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/08/debunking-myth-debt-trap-diplomacy/3-governing-belt-and-road

[22] James Kynge, Chris Campbell, Amy Kazmin and Farhan Bokhari, “How China rules the waves: Beijing’s global power play,” Financial Times, January 13, 2017, https://ig.ft.com/sites/china-ports/

[23] Joshua Kurlantzick, “Assessing China's Digital Silk Road initiative: A transformative approach to technology financing or a danger to freedoms?” Council on Foreign Relations, December 18, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/china-digital-silk-road/

[24] Rafiq Dossani, Jennifer Bouey and Keren Zhu, “Demystifying the Belt and Road Initiative: A clarification of its key features, objectives and impacts”

[25] Ibid.

[26] Human Rights Watch, “China’s global threat to human rights,” 2020, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/global

[27] Human Rights Watch, “China: ‘Belt and Road’ projects should respect rights,” April 21, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/21/china-belt-and-road-projects-should-respect-rights

[28] Sophie Richardson, “China’s influence on the global human rights system,” The Brookings Institution, September 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/FP_20200914_china_human_rights_richardson.pdf

[29] Elaine K Dezenski, “Below the Belt and Road”

[30] Mely Caballero-Anthony, An introduction to non-traditional security studies: A transnational approach, (London: SAGE Publications, 2016).

[31] John Hurley, Scott Morris and Gailyn Portelance, “Examining the debt implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a policy perspective,” Journal of Infrastructure, Policy and Development, vol. 3, no. 1 (2019), pp. 139-175, doi: 10.24294/jipd.v3i1.1123.

[32] Matt Ferchen and Anarkalee Perera, “Why unsustainable Chinese infrastructure deals are a two-way street

[33] Shahar Hameiri, “Debunking the myth of China’s ‘debt-trap diplomacy’”

[34] Mark Akpaninyie, “China’s ‘debt diplomacy’ is a misnomer. Call it ‘crony diplomacy”

[35] Indian Ministry of External Affairs, “Official Spokesperson's response to a query on participation of India in OBOR/BRI Forum,” May 13, 2017, https://mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/28463/Official+Spokespersons+response+to+a+query+on+participation+of+India+in+OBORBRI+Forum

[36] Ibid.

[37] Bhumitra Chakma, “The BRI and India’s neighbourhood,” Strategic Analysis, vol. 43, no. 3 (2019), pp. 183-186, doi: 10.1080/09700161.2019.1607030.

[38] Christian Ploberger, Political economic perspectives of China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Reshaping regional integration

[39] Lee Jones and Shahar Hameiri, “Debunking the myth of ‘debt-trap diplomacy’: How recipient countries shape China’s Belt and Road Initiative”

[40] Ibid.

[41] Elaine K Dezenski, “Below the Belt and Road”

[42] Daniel Kliman, Rush Doshi, Kristine Lee and Zack Cooper, “Grading China’s Belt and Road”

[43] Björn Alexander Düben, “Are the gloves coming off in China-Germany economic relations?” The Diplomat, May 3, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/are-the-gloves-coming-off-in-china-germany-economic-relations/

[44] Thilo Haneman and Mikko Huotari, “Chinese FDI in Europe and Germany: Preparing for a new era of Chinese capital,” The Mercator Institute for China Studies & Rhodium Group, June 2015, https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2895951/Chinese-FDI-in-Europe-and-Germany-Preparing-for.pdf

[45] Hans Von Der Burchard, “Merkel pushes EU-China investment deal over the finish line despite criticism,” Politico, December 29, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-china-investment-deal-angela-merkel-pushes-finish-line-despite-criticism/

[46] Maria Abi-Habib and Keith Bradsher, “Poor countries borrowed billions from China. They can’t pay it back”

[47] Ibid.

[48] Yukon Huang, “China is hostage to a rules-based multilateral system”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 10, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/09/10/china-is-hostage-to-rules-based-multilateral-system-pub-82679

[49] Deeparghya Mukherjee, Economic integration in Asia: Key prospects and challenges with the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (London: Routledge, 2019).

[50] Nilanjan Ghosh, “India not ready for RCEP,” East Asia Forum, December 26, 2020, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/12/26/india-not-ready-for-rcep/

[51] Jeffrey Wilson, “RCEP will redraw the economic and strategic map of the Indo-Pacific,” The Strategist, September 21, 2020, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/rcep-will-redraw-the-economic-and-strategic-map-of-the-indo-pacific/

[52] Peter Petri and Michael Plummer, “RCEP: A new trade agreement that will shape global economics and politics,” The Brookings Institution, November 16, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/11/16/rcep-a-new-trade-agreement-that-will-shape-global-economics-and-politics/

[53] Agence France-Presse, “Fifteen countries sign biggest free trade deal, giving boost to China's Belt and Road initiative,” First Post, November 15, 2020, https://www.firstpost.com/world/fifteen-countries-sign-biggest-free-trade-deal-giving-boost-to-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-9015571.html

[54] Jeffrey Wilson, “RCEP will redraw the economic and strategic map of the Indo-Pacific”

[55] Press Trust of India, “RCEP 'looks like trade arm' of Belt and Road Initiative: Former Australian PM,” Business Standard, November 20, 2019, https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/rcep-looks-like-trade-arm-of-belt-and-road-initiative-former-australian-pm-119112001560_1.html

[56] Daniel Kliman, Rush Doshi, Kristine Lee and Zack Cooper, “Grading China’s Belt and Road”

[57] Dylan Gerstel, “It’s a (debt) trap! Managing China-IMF cooperation across the Belt and Road”

[58] David Dollar, “Seven years into China’s Belt and Road,” The Brookings Institution, October 1, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/10/01/seven-years-into-chinas-belt-and-road/

[59] Dylan Gerstel, “It’s a (debt) trap! Managing China-IMF cooperation across the Belt and Road”

[60] David Dollar, “Seven years into China’s Belt and Road”

[61] Małgorzata Jakimów, “Desecuritisation as a soft power strategy: The Belt and Road Initiative, European fragmentation and China’s normative influence in Central-Eastern Europe,” Asia Europe Journal, vol. 17 (2019), pp. 369-385, doi: 10.1007/s10308-019-00561-3.

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Shiva Shah